Adaptive warfare and military dominance: Tactical innovation in contemporary global asymmetric conflicts
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.60029/Keywords:
Adaptive warfare, Tactical innovation, asymmetric conflictsAbstract
Adaptive warfare has been consolidated as a doctrine to confront asymmetric wars in complex, uncertain, volatile, and multidimensional operational environments. The objective of this review article is to examine how tactical innovation, decentralization, and the use of new technologies are revolutionizing military forces in current wars. The methodology employed consists of a literature review of scientific publications, doctrinal reports (NATO, RAND, IISS), research theses, and case studies on the conflicts in Ukraine, Yemen, the Sahel, and Gaza.
The results show that, in conventional situations of superiority, forces with an adaptable organizational structure, decentralized operations, and non-linear technological assets (such as drones, autonomous systems, electronic warfare, and cyber operations) obtain significant operational advantages.
Adaptive warfare is not a technological revolution, but rather a doctrinal revolution that redefines the principles of military science. In the Peruvian case, this entails prioritizing multi-domain operations, strengthening mission command, and developing small modules equipped with ISR, electronic warfare, and scalable counter-drone defense, thus ensuring resilient command and control. Finally, its explicit inclusion in national defense doctrines is proposed to ensure military effectiveness in future asymmetric and multi-domain wars.
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References
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Data Availability Statement
Los datos y fuentes que respaldan los análisis presentados en este artículo provienen de literatura académica, informes doctrinales y documentos de acceso abierto, todos debidamente citados en la sección de referencias. Dichos materiales pueden ser consultados públicamente a través de las plataformas y enlaces indicados. Parte de la información operativa utilizada para el análisis de casos incluye elementos de carácter estratégico y sensible que, por motivos de seguridad y confidencialidad, no pueden ser divulgados en su totalidad.
